Unlike traditional networks which are statically configured, SDN control applications are dynamic and are becoming more heterogeneous and complex. There is a great need for a framework to learn about the behavior of the various SDN applications. To the best of our knowledge, current network modeling frameworks were not designed to incorporate the application logic into their models, and thus can not be appropriately used to model SDN applications. In this paper, we suggest the possibility of leveraging the impact which control applications assert on the network information base to learn about the behavior of such applications. Based on this, we propose SDN-VSA, a framework that models SDN control applications as a set of affine transformations in some Vector Space. Finally, we present an analytical formulation for such framework, and discuss a use-case for the framework in analyzing flow-steering in SDN service chains.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Software-Defined Networking (SDN), the control of the whole network is now transferred to the SDN controller which enables a set of network applications to function. It is of a great prominence to be able to analyze these applications for problems prior the actual deployment. Problems such as forwarding loops, blackholes, and conflicting flow rules, if not fixed, might disrupt the operation of some network services or even bring those services down.
A multitude of network analysis frameworks [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] have been devised for analyzing traditional networks, and some of these solutions could possibly be imported into SDN. Network checking tools could be devised on top of such frameworks (e.g., NetPlumber [6] ). These tools can read the configurations of network devices then check these configurations for possible networking issues.
Traditional networks -contrary to SDNs -are staticallyconfigured making them easier to be analyzed in comparison to SDNs, which can be running a myriad of control applications. These applications have an impact on the network operation, security and performance, and hence their impact must be accounted for when the network is being analyzed. We believe that network analysis frameworks can be useful in SDN for the following reasons: (1) SDN applications can be complex, so there is a need to reason about how would they function prior the actual deployment, (2) controllers, in many cases, allow more than one SDN application to run simultaneously. Hence, there is a need to be able to check if those applications would create any conflict, and (3) a what-if analysis for any new rules could be conducted by controllers.
Existing network analysis frameworks modeled network devices (and middle-boxes) as network transfer functions (e.g., HSA [1] ) without considering the applications details (i.e., finding network transfer functions for SDN applications requires considering the applications' logic). Other frameworks considered network applications by focusing on formal verification of the implementation. Our objective, in this paper, is to fill a gap by considering SDN applications details without investigating the implementation details.
We present SDN Vector Space Analysis (SDN-VSA), a framework for modeling SDN control applications. SDN-VSA leverages the impact which control applications assert on the network information base (NIB) (see §IV-A) to learn about the behavior of such applications. The framework models the switching functionalities as affine transformations [7] . Our framework specifically targets SDN, in particular, we focus on modeling SDN control applications, flow-tables and flow-rules. To realize such framework, we propose to model the control application as a composite transformation matrix operating on a network information base matrix.
In this paper, we make the following contributions: 1) Our first contribution is to consider the impact of SDN applications on the network rather than the traditional investigation of the implementation correctness. We do this by proposing an analytical framework (SDN-VSA) using vector spaces and affine transformations for modeling SDN control application. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to model SDN control applications as transformations using vectors spaces. 2) Our second contribution is presenting a formulation for such framework (based on its axioms) which can be used to analyze and reason about SDN control applications. 3) Our third contribution is discussing a use-case for the proposed framework in SDN service chaining. 4) Finally, we contributed a classification of related work. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In §II, we provide background on the topic and related work. We discuss the need for an SDN framework in §III. The proposed framework is presented in §IV. Then, we present our formulation for such framework in §V. The SDN service chaining use-case is shown in §VI. Finally §VII will be our conclusion and an outline for possible foreseeable work.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
In this section, we survey and classify a number of relevant frameworks which were devised for network analysis. Table  I includes a comparison of these frameworks. Section III addresses the different problem from the related work.
Karsten et al. [2] found that the current Internet architecture occasionally violates the layered architecture (e.g., NAT). So they created an axiomatic framework intended to reason about the forwarding mechanisms in networks and to serve as a basis for verification and formal proofs of correctness of protocols and their implementations. Their formalization is based on high-level Hoare-style assertions (Hoare-logic). However, their work only considers connectivity, and is oblivious to time and cannot model losses and timeouts.
Kazemian et al. [1] found that even when individual protocols function correctly, failures can arise from the complex interactions of their aggregates. Thus, they came up with a protocol-agnostic framework called "Header Space Analysis" (HSA) based on a geometric model for packet classification, with the objective of detecting an important class of failures (e.g., forwarding loops), regardless of the protocols running. They modeled the network boxes (e.g., switches) as transfer functions that operate on the packet headers.
Kazemian et al. [6] developed NetPlumber based on HSA but unlike HSA, it incrementally checks for compliance of state changes, by maintaining a dependency graph between rules (i.e., a graph of flow tables). The tool was used to detect loops, blackholes and reachability problems. Finally, NetPlumber (like HSA) relies on reading the state of network devices and therefore cannot model middleboxes with dynamic state, and it requires great processing time for verifying link updates.
Dhawan et al. [3] were concerned with the security and correct functioning of the entire SDN. They presented SPHINX to detect both known and potentially unknown attacks on network topology and data plane forwarding originating within an SDN. SPHINX analyzes specific OpenFlow control messages to learn new network behavior and metadata for both topological and forwarding state. They studied attacks on the network topology such as: ARP poisoning, and fake topology, as well as attacks on data-plane forwarding such as: controller DoS, network DoS, TCAM exhaustion, and switching blackholes.
Anderson et al. [4] were concerned with the lack of a semantic foundation to reason precisely about networking code. Thus, they presented NetKAT a new network programming language based on Kleene algebra a solid mathematical foundation and comes equipped with a complete equational theory. NetKAT models the network as an automaton that moves packets from one node to another along the links in its topology and hence makes use of regular expressions and the language of finite automata.
Network operators need tools to determine the impact of changes that they make, because bad updates can bring down the entire network. Nelson et al. [5] developed Chimp a tool for static differential analysis of SDN control applications without the need of formal methods. Chimp can be used to present the semantic or the behavioral difference between any two versions of an application.
Panda et al. [8] designed VMN, a system that be used to verify reachability and isolation properties for middle-boxes. VMN models the network as a graph of middle-boxes and end-hosts connected by a network transfer function, and a set of middle-boxes forwarding models. The system converts the middle-boxes models into first-order logic statements which is verified by a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver. 
III. THE NEED FOR ANOTHER FRAMEWORK
Recent work in network analysis mainly handles the case of static analysis of networks in order to find important classes of failures. However, network states are dynamic and can frequently change, making those frameworks unfeasible for real-time analysis.
Some frameworks were not developed to be used during application design as they require a functioning network to monitor and analyze (e.g., SPHINX [12] ). Those frameworks depend on monitoring the network state, which means that they can only be used after deployment. Others do not take the application logic into their consideration, and hence fail to model dynamic stateful SDN applications, those that their current state depends on previous states such as statefulfirewalls and network address translation (NAT). The proposed SDN modeling framework tries to fill a gap by allowing the modeling of the applications' logic without having to consider implementation details, which can be used to analyze and reason about SDN applications behavior. Moreover, we believe that one way to reason about SDN applications is through studying the impact they have on the network information base (NIB). Therefore, on contrary to HSA [1] which was designed to be protocol-agnostic and considers packets as first class citizens. Our model is SDN-specific and considers flows as first class citizens. HSA models packets as points in header space (H) while ignoring protocol-specific meanings associated with header bits, which comes at the cost of requiring large number of dimensions. However, in SDN OpenFlow-enabled switches, we only need to consider certain fields (listed in Figure 1 ) in the packet header such as source IP address, MAC address, and port number, and destination IP address, MAC address, and port number. The reason is that OpenFlow [9] only allows matching against or modifying those fields. As with SPHINX [3] , the control logic will be split into OpenFlow [9] primitive control messages. Each control message should be studied carefully and represented as a transform that would change the current network state.
IV. THE SDN-VSA FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework (SDN-VSA) assumes that SDN control applications are deterministic applications (i.e., they produce the same output for a certain input). Hence, the framework can exploit the impact (i.e., via the OpenFlow messages they send to the switches) that applications have on the network information base to learn about the behavior of such applications. In this section, we make some important definitions, and we present the main axioms of the proposed framework which are required in order to model SDN control applications.
A. Definitions
Definition 1: Control Application: is a set of instructions running at the control-plane which has the ability to control the switching functionalities of connected data-planes and collect information from them via messages of a standard protocol (e.g., OpenFlow).
Definition 2: Action: is an instruction associated with a header, installed by the control application and executed by the data-plane when a flow arrives matching that header. In case of OpenFlow, actions are installed by FLOW MOD messages.
Definition 3: Network Information Base (NIB): is the aggregate of topology and/or state information that allows a control application to function properly.
B. Axioms
The following axioms represent a basis for the SDN-VSA framework:
Axiom 1: Any OpenFlow message can be modeled as a linear map in some vector space. Let M be the set of all OpenFlow messages, and V is some vector space over a field F , then:
Axiom 2: Any OpenFlow action can be modeled as a linear map in some vector space (n-dimensional space). Let A be the set of all OpenFlow actions, and V is some vector space over a field F , then:
From the definitions presented in §IV-A and the Axioms 1 and 2 proposed in §IV-B, we can deduce the following propositions:
Proposition 1: A control application can be modeled as a composite transformation matrix that operates on a network information base matrix. In other words, if two or more control applications have the same composite transformation matrices, then these applications yield the same impact on the NIB and can be considered equivalent. Moreover, in some cases, the composite transformation matrix for these congruent applications is the product (result of multiplication) of different numbers of transformations matrices. In such case, it could be better to choose the application with the least number of transformations matrices to implement. The Congruence Principle can also be generalized to compare a number of a set of applications (service chains) for congruency (see Proposition 3 in §VI).
V. THE FORMULATION
In this section, we present a formulation for the SDN-VSA framework. Other formulations might also exist. Depending on the control applications, the NIB might include more network information (i.e., application-specific or non-OpenFlow) other than just the flow tables. However, in this paper, we only formulate flows tables. More specifically, we define T -space (T , +, ×), a vector space over a Galois field [10] of two elements (GF(2)) (for simplicity) where control messages can be represented as linear maps as postulated by Axiom 1. Then, we formulate R-space, the flow-rules space, where actions can be modeled as linear maps as postulated by Axiom 2.
A. Assumptions
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
• OpenFlow counters can be: (1) per-table, (2) per-flow,
(3) per-port, and (4) per-queue counters. However, in this formulation, we only consider per-flow counters (we assume a single per-flow counter). • We assume that a switch can have a single flow-table.
Hence, a switch can be seen equivalent to a flow table. • We are not considering queues and Quality of Service (QoS) in this formulation. • We assume the network topology to be static i.e., no switches can be removed or added.
B. Flow Tables Space (T -space)
Let T be the set of all flow tables. A flow table t ∈ T can be modeled as a set of tuples (i.e., ordered-pairs) of rules (r) and counters (c) (see Figure 1 ). Therefore, we define t as:
Let t, t 1 , t 2 , Φ ∈ T . Let +, × be two operations (vector addition and scalar multiplication, respectively) such that ∀t 1 , t 2 ∈ T , t 1 + t 2 ∈ T and ∀a ∈ GF (2), a × t ∈ T . We define the vector addition using basic set theory as follows:
We define the scalar multiplication as follows:
Moreover, for every flow table t ∈ T with a number (n) of flow rules (∈ R), we can define another flow table (−t) ∈ T with an equal number (n) of flow rules, such that every flow rule (r ∈ R) in t has an additive inverse (−r ∈ R) in (−t).
Since, the following conditions are satisfied [11] :
Therefore, T -space (T , +, ×) is a vector space over GF (2) a Galois field of two elements.
C. Flow Rules Space (R-space)
Let R be the set of all flow rules. A flow rule r ∈ R can be modeled as a vector (tuple) of: (1) a header h ∈ H n (to match against) where n is the number of OpenFlow header fields, (2) an output port p − , (3) a time-to-live τ (we assume one type of TTL), and (4) a set of actions α ∈ A (a composite transformation matrix).
In HSA [1] , the H-space is protocol-agnostic. Hence, it views a packet header as a sequence of ones and zeros in an -dimensional space ({0, 1} ) ( is the header length in bits). We model 1 a header h ∈ H n in a similar way, but we only consider the case of OpenFlow. In particular, we represent a header h as a tuple of the n OpenFlow's fixed-length header fields (see Figure 1 ): h =< f1, f2, ....., fn > . . . ∀h ∈ H n , ∀fi ∈ H
An action α ∈ A is a function in the flow header h ∈ H n , hence it can be modeled as follows:
Finally, for every flow rule r ∈ R with a set of actions α ∈ A, we can define another flow rule (−r) ∈ R with the same flow header h ∈ H n and the same output port p − , such that (−r) has a set of actions α −1 ∈ A. Let I be the identity matrix, then:
We call (−r) the additive inverse of r.
D. Actions
In OpenFlow, a FLOW MOD message can be used to add, modify, or delete a flow rule from a flow table. In case of add or modify commands, an action list needs to be specified. The following actions are supported by OpenFlow: 1) Forward: An OFPAT OUTPUT action is responsible for outputting any matched flow to a specific switch port i.e., forwarding. A forward action (α f (h)) can be modeled as a translation of the output port (p − ) by δ as follows:
2) Drop: In OpenFlow, a packet belonging to a matched flow is dropped when the flow rule has an empty action list. Therefore, a flow dropping action (α d (h)) can be modeled as a zero-scaling transformation as follows:
3) Modify-Field: In OpenFlow, certain header fields (∈ H n ) can be modified (see Figure 1 ) by a modify-field action. Hence, a modify-field action (α m (h)) can be modeled as a translation of the flow header h by δ ∈ H n as follows:
VI. SDN SERVICE CHAINING USE-CASE
With the increasing popularity of SDN as an enabler technology for Network Function Virtualization (NFV) in the Cloud, network service providers tend to implement their middle-boxed network services as Virtualized Network Functions (VNF) [12] . Such services include but are not limited to load-balancers, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [13] . The process of chaining those services is known as service chaining.
Oftentimes, network service providers -for many reasons -tend to steer different flows across different sets of middleboxes (i.e., services) [14] . Recent research is concerned with the issues of steering packets through different middle-boxes [15] . Moreover, in some cases, the order at which the flows steer the network services matters. For example, in the simple case of two services (show in Figure 2 ): a load-balancer and an IDS, it is often more appropriate to steer incoming flows through the IDS first then the load-balancer in order to reduce the latency (the NIB used in this paper does not countin latencies) or prevent any malicious flows from reaching the load-balanced servers. In such case, we believe that the proposed framework can be used to reason about flow steering in SDN-enabled network services.
As network services are also control applications, then based on Proposition 1 (see §IV-C) of the proposed framework, they can be modeled individually as composite transformation matrices. Additionally, we can simply deduce the following Proposition:
Proposition 3: Any chain of services can be modeled as a composite transformation matrix of its set of services that operates on a network information base matrix in some vector space.
We can also deduce from Proposition 2 (see §IV-C) "The Congruence Principle" that any two chains of services are congruent in a certain vector space if-and-only-if their composite transformation matrices in that vector space are equal.
Moreover, based on the fact that matrix multiplication is non-commutative, different orders of same services can yield different composite transformation matrices. However, as translation is isomorphic in T -space (T , +, ×), order does not matter in any service chain that only contains translations.
For example, assume the following two service chains (shown in Figure 2 ): (1) IDS → LB (shown in blue in Figure  2 ), and (2) LB → IDS (shown in red in Figure 2 ). Let A f be a forwarding action, A d be a drop action, and A m,f be a composite action of modify then forward actions. Let N (h) be a function which given a certain header h, returns the total number of flows f i having the same source field as h. And let ν be the anomaly detection threshold.
Let L(s) be a function that given a certain server's IP address s, returns the total number of flows f i currently handled by that server.
In the first case (IDS → LB), the control transformation matrices (X IDS and X LB ) would be:
Where p LB is the load-balancer's port. p s1 , and p s2 are the first and second server's ports, respectively. In the second case (LB → IDS), the control transformation matrices (Y IDS and Y LB ) would be: From (27) and (32), the composite transformation matrices for the two service chains are not equal X IDS→LB = Y LB→IDS . Therefore, the two service chains: IDS → LB, and LB → IDS are not congruent i.e., they have different impact on the network information base.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We only presented the use-case of analyzing flow steering in network service chains. However, the proposed framework could be used for other uses-cases. For example, the proposed framework could be investigated to see if it detects forwarding loops. A forward loop is created when a packet (with an unchanged header) returns to a port it previously visited [1] . Using SDN-VSA, a forwarding loop could possibly be detected by analyzing the composite transformation matrix.
In this paper, we proposed SDN-VSA, a framework that uses affine transformations and vector spaces to model SDN control applications. Then, we presented a formulation for the framework that can be used in the analysis of SDN control applications. Finally, we showed a uses-case for the SDN-VSA framework. In the future, we plan to demonstrate more use-cases for such framework, and explore the computational challenges associated with our formulation. Nonetheless, we plan to explore other formulations for the SDN-VSA framework using different vector spaces which can support more complex OpenFlow functionalities as QoS. Lastly, we plan to investigate the feasibility of incorporating network losses in our framework.
